Which country produces the most semiconductors?
Mainland China held the largest share of global chip manufacturing capacity in 2022, at 24%, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) and Boston Consulting Group (BCG). Taiwan followed with 18%, Japan and South Korea with 17% each, the United States with 10% and Europe with 8%. These are shares of wafer capacity across all chip types, counted by where the fab sits.
That ranking changes at the leading edge. Taiwan makes most of the world's most advanced logic chips, and much of China's capacity runs older, mature processes used in cars, appliances and power electronics. Hardware.co's graphic on advanced semiconductor manufacturing by country covers that narrower slice.
How has semiconductor production by country changed since 1990?
The U.S. share of global chipmaking capacity fell from 37% in 1990 to 10% in 2022, and Europe's fell from 44% to 8%, according to SIA/BCG. Taiwan went the other way, from 2% in 1990 to 22% by 2000 and a peak of 24% in 2015. Mainland China had no printed share on the chart until 2005, when it held 7%; it reached 24% in 2022.
Japan is the steadiest line on the chart: between 15% and 21% in every labeled year from 1990 to the 2032 forecast. South Korea climbed from 12% in 1995 to 18% by 2015 and is forecast to reach 19% by 2030. SIA/BCG adjusted their forecast for South Korea's planned chip mega-cluster in Gyeonggi Province.
What percentage of chips are made in the U.S.?
The United States held 10% of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity in 2022, down from 12% in 2020 and 37% in 1990. SIA/BCG forecast that U.S. capacity will grow 203% between 2022 and 2032, from 1,121 to 3,393 thousand wafer starts a month in 300mm equivalents, lifting the U.S. share to 14%. SIA calls that the first time in decades the U.S. has grown its share of world chipmaking.
The pace is a sharp break from the prior decade, when U.S. capacity grew just 11%, the least of any major region, while mainland China's grew 365%. In 2020, before the CHIPS and Science Act, SIA/BCG had projected the U.S. share would keep sliding to 10% by 2030.
How much will the CHIPS Act change U.S. chip production?
SIA/BCG estimate the CHIPS Act lifts the U.S. share of global chip capacity in 2032 to 14%, compared with 8% without it. They also project the U.S. will draw 28% of the world's $2.3 trillion in fab capital spending from 2024 to 2032, or $646 billion, second only to Taiwan's $716 billion. At the pre-CHIPS pace, the U.S. would have drawn 9%.
Most of that money is foreign. South Korean companies account for 37% of the spending headed to U.S. fabs and Taiwanese companies for 32%, against 30% from U.S.-based companies. Global spending is also far larger than before: $2.3 trillion in 2024–2032 compared with $720 billion in 2013–2022.
Methodology & caveats
Visual Capitalist's chart of semiconductor production by country or region is drawn from Exhibit 7 of SIA/BCG's May 2024 report, Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply Chain. This graphic reads every value from the report itself. "Production" here means installed manufacturing capacity, not output or revenue: SIA/BCG count commercial wafer fabs with at least 5,000 wafer starts a month on 200mm (8-inch) or larger wafers, convert them to 300mm equivalents, and exclude R&D fabs. The report says this rule leaves out the smaller-wafer fabs common in the 1990s, which "significantly influenced" the regional shares for that period, so the 1990 figures (such as Europe's 44%) describe modern-wafer capacity only.
Shares are the whole-percent labels printed on the chart for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2022, plus forecasts for 2025, 2030 and 2032 made in early 2024. Region-years with no printed label (South Korea and Others in 1990, mainland China before 2005) are left out, not set to zero. Columns may total 99% to 101% because of rounding. Growth rates (Fig. 3), capital spending (Fig. 4) and the CHIPS Act counterfactual (Fig. 5) are SIA/BCG model outputs, not measured values, and depend on announced projects as of March 15, 2024. Capital spending by headquarters (Fig. 6) uses the chart's printed shares; its 1% remainder is unlabeled. Others includes Malaysia, Singapore, India, Israel (in Exhibit 5) and the rest of the world.
Sources
- [1]Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group. Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply Chain (May 2024): Exhibit 5, Future flows of CapEx from company HQ region to destination region, 2024–2032F; Exhibit 7, Global 200mm+ commercial semiconductor fab capacity share by region, 1990–2032F; Exhibit 8, Semiconductor capacity increase by region, 2022–2032Fhttps://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Report_Emerging-Resilience-in-the-Semiconductor-Supply-Chain.pdf
- [2]Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association. Government Incentives and US Competitiveness in Semiconductor Manufacturing (September 2020): Exhibit 1 and status-quo scenariohttps://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Government-Incentives-and-US-Competitiveness-in-Semiconductor-Manufacturing-Sep-2020.pdf
- [3]Semiconductor Industry Association. America Projected to Triple Semiconductor Manufacturing Capacity by 2032, the Largest Rate of Growth in the World (press release, May 8, 2024)https://www.semiconductors.org/america-projected-to-triple-semiconductor-manufacturing-capacity-by-2032-the-largest-rate-of-growth-in-the-world/


